The physical layer security in the up-link of the wireless communication systems is often modeled as the multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT), and recently it has received a lot attention. In this paper, the MAC-WT has been re-visited by considering the situation that the legitimate receiver feeds his received channel output back to the transmitters via two noiseless channels, respectively. This model is called the MAC-WT with noiseless feedback.
I. INTRODUCTION
The physical layer security (PLS) was first investigated by Wyner in his landmark paper on the degraded wiretap channel [1] . Wyner's degraded wiretap channel model consists of one transmitter and two receivers (a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper). The transmitter sends a private message to the legitimate receiver via a discrete memoryless main channel, and an eavesdropper eavesdrops the output of the main channel via another discrete memoryless wiretap channel. We say that the perfect secrecy is achieved if no information about the private 
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message is leaked to the eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity C s , which is the maximum reliable transmission rate with perfect secrecy constraint, was characterized by Wyner [1] , and it is given by C s = max p(x) (I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z)), (1.1) where X, Y and Z are the input of the main channel, output of the main channel and output of the wiretap channel, respectively, and they satisfy the Markov chain X → Y → Z. Here note that (1.1) holds under the degradedness assumption X → Y → Z, and the secrecy capacity of the general wiretap channel (the wiretap channel without the degradedness assumption) was determined by Csiszár and Körner [2] . The work of [1] and [2] lays a foundation for the PLS of the practical communication systems.
Since Wozencraft et al. [3] showed that the time-variant noisy two-way channels can be used to provide noiseless feedback, whether this noiseless feedback helps to enhance the capacities of various communication channels
motivates the researchers to study the channels with noiseless feedback. Shannon first proved that the noiseless feedback does not increase the capacity of a point-to-point discrete memoryless channel (DMC) [4] . After that,
Cover et al. [5] , [6] and Bross et al. [7] showed that the capacity regions of several multi-user channels, such as multiple-access channel (MAC) and relay channel, can be enhanced by feeding back the receiver's channel output to the transmitter over a noiseless channel. Then, it is natural to ask: does the noiseless feedback from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter also help to enhance the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel? Ahlswede and Cai [8] answered this question by considering the wiretap channel with noiseless feedback. Since the noiseless feedback is known by the legitimate receiver and the transmitter, and it is not available for the eavesdropper, Ahlswede and Cai pointed out that the noiseless feedback can be used to generate a secret key shared only between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, and we can use this key to encrypt the transmitted messages. Combining the idea of generating a secret key from the noiseless feedback with Wyner's random binning technique used in the achievability proof of (1.1), Ahlswede and Cai showed that the secrecy capacity C sf of the degraded wiretap channel with noiseless feedback is given by
where X, Y and Z are defined the same as those in (1.1), and X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain. Comparing (1.2) with (1.1), it is easy to see that the noiseless feedback increases the secrecy capacity of the degraded wiretap channel. Other related works on the wiretap channel with noiseless feedback are in [9] - [11] .
In recent years, the PLS in the up-link of wireless communication system receives a lot attention, see [12] - [16] .
These work extends Wyner's wiretap channel to a multiple access situation: the multiple-access wiretap channel (MAC-WT). Bounds on the secrecy capacity region of MAC-WT are provided in [12] - [16] . In order to investigate whether the noiseless feedback from the legitimate receiver to the transmitters helps to enhance the secrecy capacity region of the MAC-WT, in this paper, we study the MAC-WT with noiseless feedback, see Figure 1 . We first present a DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the model of Figure 1 , and this bound is constructed by using the DF strategy of the MAC-WT with noisy feedback [17] , where each transmitter of the MAC decodes the other one's transmitted message from the noisy feedback and then uses it to re-encode his own messages. Second, note that the noiseless feedback can not only be used to re-encode the messages of the transmitters, but also be used to generate secret keys to encrypt the transmitted messages, thus we present a hybrid inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the model of Figure 1 by combining Ahlswede and Cai's idea of generating a secret key from the noiseless feedback [8] with the DF strategy used in [17] , and we show that this hybrid inner bound is strictly larger than the DF inner bound. Third, we present a sato-type outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the model of Figure 1 . Finally, the results of this paper are further explained via a Gaussian example.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we show the definitions, notations and the main results of the model of Figure 1 . An Gaussian example of the model of Figure 1 is provided in Section III. Final conclusions are presented in Section IV. Basic notations: We use the notation p V (v) to denote the probability mass function P r{V = v}, where V (capital letter) denotes the random variable, v (lower case letter) denotes the real value of the random variable V . Denote the alphabet in which the random variable V takes values by V (calligraphic letter). Similarly, let U N be a random vector (U 1 , ..., U N ), and u N be a vector value (u 1 , ..., u N ). In the rest of this paper, the log function is taken to the base 2.
Definitions of the model of Figure 1 : i.e., at the i-th time, the channel outputs Y i and Z i depend only on X 1,i and X 2,i , and thus we have
Since y N can be fed back to the transmitters via a noiseless feedback channel, at the i-th time, the channel input
Here note that the i-th time channel encoder f j,i (j = 1, 2) is a stochastic encoder, and the transmission rates of 
The eavesdropper's equivocation to the messages W 1 and W 2 is defined as
A positive rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is called achievable with weak secrecy if, for any small positive , there exists an
Here we note that ∆ ≥ R 1 + R 2 − also ensures 
for some distribution
Proof:
In the MAC-WT with noisy feedback [17] , the legitimate receiver's channel output Y is sent to the transmitters via two noisy feedback channels, and the outputs of the noisy feedback channel are Y 1 and Y 2 . Substituting Theorem 2: For the discrete memoryless MAC-WT with noiseless feedback, an inner bound C in s on the secrecy capacity region C s is given by
for some distribution satisfying (2.7).
Proof:
The hybrid inner bound C in s is constructed by combining Ahlswede and Cai's idea of generating a secret key from the noiseless feedback [8] with the DF strategy used in [17, Theorem 2] , and it is achieved by the following key steps:
• For the transmitter 1, split the transmitted message W 1 into W 1,0 and W 1,1 , and let W * 1 be a dummy message randomly generated by the transmitter 1, and it is used to confuse the eavesdropper. Analogously, for the transmitter 2, split the transmitted message W 2 into W 2,0 and W 2,1 , and let W * 2 be a dummy message randomly generated by the transmitter 2, and it is used to confuse the eavesdropper.
• The messages W 1 and W 2 are transmitted through n blocks, and in block i (2 ≤ i ≤ n), when each transmitter receives the noiseless feedback, he tries to decode the other transmitter's message (including the transmitted message and the dummy message) and uses it to re-encode his own message. In addition, the noiseless feedback is used to generate a pair of secret keys (K * 1 , K * 2 ), and K * j (j = 1, 2) is used to encrypt the sub-message W j,1 .
• Comparing the above code construction of C in s with that of C DF s , the encoding and decoding schemes of these two bounds are almost the same, except that the sub-message W j,1 (j = 1, 2) is encrypted by a secret key K * j . Thus the secrecy sum rate R 1 + R 2 is bounded by two part: the first part is the upper bound on the sum rate of C DF s , and the second part is the upper bound on the rate of the secret keys K * 1 and K * 2 . Using the balanced coloring lemma introduced by Ahlswede and Cai [8] , we conclude that the rate of the secret keys K * 1 and K * 2 is bounded by min{H(Y |X 1 , X 2 , Z), I(X 1 , X 2 ; Z)}. Thus, the hybrid inner bound C in s is obtained.
The details of the proof are in Appendix A. on the secrecy capacity region C s is given by
Proof: The outer bound C out s is a simple sato-type outer bound, and the proof is in Appendix B.
III. GAUSSIAN EXAMPLE

A. Capacity Results on the Gaussian MAC-WT with Noiseless Feedback
For the Gaussian case of the model of Figure 1 , the channel inputs and outputs satisfy
where the channel noises N 1 and N 2 are independent and Gaussian distributed, i.e., N 1 ∼ N (0, σ 2 1 ), and N 2 ∼ N (0, σ 2 2 ). The average power constraint of the transmitted signal X j (j = 1, 2) is given by
The DF and partial DF inner bounds on the secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian case of the model of 
),
Proof: In Remark 1, we have shown that for the model of Figure 1 , the DF inner bound is the same as the partial DF inner bound. Along the lines of [17, pp. 610-611], we have
Note that in (3.4), 
Proof: Similar to the corresponding proof in [17, pp. 610-611], substituting
, and using the fact that U , U 1 and U 2 are independent and Gaussian distributed with zero mean and unit variance, and
), (3.5) is directly obtained. Here note that (3.5) is achieved when α = 1 and β = 1.
The proof is completed.
The outer bound on the secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian case of the model of 
For the case that σ 
• For the case that σ 
Substituting (3.8) into Theorem 3, we have
Substituting (3.10) into Theorem 3, we have
where (a) is from the entropy power inequality, i.e., 2
, and (b) is from the
Finally, recall that Tekin and Yener [12] have shown that for the Gaussian MAC-WT without feedback, an inner bound C gmac−wt s is given by
B. Power Control for the Maximum Secrecy Sum Rate of C gi s
In this subsection, we assume that the average power constraints of the transmitters satisfy 
In the remainder of this subsection, we calculate the maximum secrecy sum rate R * sum of C gi s , and show the optimum power control (the optimum of P 1 and P 2 is denoted by P * 1 and P * 2 , respectively) for R * sum . Theorem 7: If σ 15) and the optimum power control is given by and the optimum power control is given by Proof: From Theorem 5, it is easy to see that the secrecy sum rate R sum of C gi s is given by
)}, (3.19) and (3.19) can be re-written as
(3.20)
Since 0 ≤ P 1 + P 2 ≤ 2P , the secrecy sum rate R sum in (3.20) can be considered into the following three cases:
, it is easy to see that R sum is increasing while P 1 and P 2 are increasing, and thus we have
), and the corresponding optimum P * 1 and P * 2 equal to P .
• (Case 2:) If P > 
It is not difficult to show that for this case, R * sum = , and the corresponding optimum P * 1 and P * 2 equal to P .
• (Case 3:) If P > Combining the above three cases, Theorem 7 is obtained, and the proof is completed. 11 The following Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the maximum secrecy sum rate R * sum and the corresponding optimum power control for σ , respectively. It is easy to see that for both cases, R * sum tends to a constant while P tends to infinity. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present two inner bounds and one outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the MAC-WT with noiseless feedback. To be specific, the first inner bound is constructed by using the DF strategy, where each transmitter decodes the other one's transmitted message from the noiseless feedback and then uses the decoded message to re-encode his own messages. The second inner bound is constructed by combining Ahlswede and Cai's idea of generating a secret key from the noiseless feedback [8] with the DF strategy used in the first inner bound.
The outer bound is a simple sato-type bound. We show that the second inner bound is strictly larger than the first one, and the capacity results are further explained via a Gaussian example. The messages W 1 = (W 1,1 , . .., W 1,n ) and W 2 = (W 2,1 , ..., W 2,n ) are transmitted through n blocks. In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the transmitted message w j,i (j = 1, 2) is denoted by w j,i = (w j,i,0 , w j,i,1 ), where w j,i,0 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2 N Rj0 }, w j,i,1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2 N Rj1 }, w j,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2 N Rj } and R j = R j0 + R j1 . Here note that in block 1, the transmitted message w j,1 = (w j,1,0 , const) (j = 1, 2), which implies that the sub-message w j,1,1 is a constant.
For block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), let w * 1,i and w * 2,i be the randomly generated dummy messages for transmitters 1 and 2, respectively. Here w * j,i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2 N R * j } (j = 1, 2). 
Construction of the code-books: In each block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), for a fixed joint probability P Z,Y |X1,X2 (z, y|x 1 , x 2 )
, and index these sequences as u i (w 0,i ), where 1 ≤ w 0,i ≤ 2
For each w 0,i , randomly generate 2 
Thus in block i, the transmitter 2 sends u i with the index w 0,i = (w 1,i−1 , w 2,i−1 ).
In block i (2 ≤ i ≤ n), before choosing the transmitted codewords x 1,i and x 2,i , we generate a mapping
as a random variable uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., 2 N (R11+R21) }, and it is independent of
and W * 2,i . Here note that K * i,j (j = 1, 2) is used as a secret key shared by the transmitter j and the receiver, and k * i,j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2 N Rj1 } is a specific value of K * i,j . Reveal the mapping g i to the transmitters, receiver and the eavesdropper. After the generation of the secret key, the transmitter j (j = 1, 2) sends x j,i with the index
Decoding scheme for the receiver: The intended receiver does backward decoding after the transmission of all n blocks is completed, and the receiver's decoding scheme is exactly the same as that of the classical MAC with feedback [5, pp. 295-296] . Following similar steps of error probability analysis for MAC with feedback [5, pp. 
295-296], we have
Here note that
where 1 and 2 tend to 0 as N tends to infinity, (A6) can be further bounded by
Equivocation analysis (2): Bound on eavesdropper's equivocation ∆: For all blocks, the equivocation ∆ is bounded by
where (a) is from the definitions W j,0 = (W j,1,0 , ..., W j,n,0 ) and W j,1 = (W j,2,1 , ..., W j,n,1 ) for j = 1, 2. The conditional entropy H(W 1,0 , W 2,0 |Z n ) of (A9) is bounded by and from the properties of AEP, we see that the eavesdropper's decoding error probability tends to 0 if 
where ( 
The bound (A13) implies that if
we can prove that ∆ ≥ R 10 + R 11 + R 20 + R 21 − by choosing sufficiently large n and N .
Finally, applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see, e.g., [18] ) on (A1), (A2), (A3), (A11) and (A14), Theorem 2 is obtained. The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Note that 
= H(Y J |Z J , J) + δ(P e ) N
≤ H(
where (1) is from (2.5), (2) is from Fano's inequality, (3) and (4) are from the fact that J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }), and it is independent of Y N , Z N , W 1 and W 2 , (5) is from P e ≤ and δ(P e ) is increasing while P e is increasing, and (6) is from the definitions Y Y J and Z Z J . Letting → 0,
is proved. The proof of Theorem 3 is completed.
